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Abstract
Many philosophers have raised difficulties for any attempt to proportion punishment 
severity to crime seriousness. One reason for this may be that offering a full theory 
of proportionality is simply too ambitious. I suggest a more modest project: setting 
a lower bound on proportionate punishment. That is, I suggest a metric to meas-
ure when punishment is not disproportionately severe. I claim that punishment is 
not disproportionately severe if it imposes costs on a criminal wrongdoer which are 
no greater than the costs which they intentionally caused to others. I flesh out the 
implications of this Lower bound by discussing how to measure the costs of crime. 
Methodologically, I claim that different costs should be compared by considering 
preferences. Substantively, I claim that many proportionality judgements undercount 
the costs of crime by focusing only on the marginal and not the average cost. I sug-
gest that we may hold defendants causally responsible for their contribution to the 
costs of that type of crime.
Keywords Proportionality · Cost of crime · Punishment
Proportionality leads a double life. Criminal law theorists have noted a range of 
severe difficulties for any attempt to proportion punishment severity to crime seri-
ousness. It requires selecting a common metric of gravity across all crimes and pun-
ishments. This metric must offer both relative and absolute proportionality judge-
ments. No-one claims to have resolved these difficulties. And yet, despite this, many 
sentencing codes purport to make such proportionality judgements with little appar-
ent difficulty. In practice, almost all agree that murder is more serious than robbery, 
which in turn is more serious than petty theft. Setting a relative scale of gravity has 
not proven controversial. There’s less consensus as to how to anchor this scale to 
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absolute figures. But many sentencing codes have been enacted without too much 
dissent. What explains the mismatch between this practical ease and those theoret-
ical difficulties? The answer, I think, is that criminal law theorists are ambitious. 
They want to uncover a full theory of proportionality which can explain these pro-
portionality judgements (or explain why they are mistaken).1
Unfortunately, no full theory has resolved those theoretical difficulties. I will not 
propose another full theory of proportionality. Instead, I’ll start with obvious and 
uncontroversial proportionality judgements, and then work up to a wider principle 
from there. This is easier said than done. Only a small range of punishments are 
precisely proportionate, whereas everything else is disproportionate. So, I will only 
offer approximate judgements.2 In practice, most theorists are concerned with dis-
proportionately severe punishments, not those that are disproportionately lenient. 
So, I will only consider cases where some punishment is obviously not dispropor-
tionately severe. (Throughout, this is what I mean by ‘proportionate’). Within these 
limitations, I’ll generalise from uncontroversial cases to reach a lower bound for 
proportionate punishment. That is the aim of Sect. 1.
This lower bound will not apply to every potential punishment, from parental 
discipline through to international sanctions. That would be too ambitious. Instead, 
I’ll limit my attention only to punishments imposed in response to criminal wrongs 
committed without any defence.3 (I’ll mention other limitations in Sect. 2).
In the final sections, I’ll flesh out what this lower bound implies in practice.
In addition to avoiding a full theory of proportionality, I also want to avoid reli-
ance on any particular theory of (the justification for) punishment. I want to start 
with an ecumenically uncontroversial case of proportionate punishment. This 
requires some defending. Isn’t it true that whether some punishment is proportionate 
to a crime depends on the underlying theory of punishment at work?4 If punishment 
aims to impose deserved suffering on the offender, then it should inflict a propor-
tionate amount of suffering. By contrast, if punishment aims to deter future potential 
wrongdoers, then it is proportionate insofar as it causes the right amount of deter-
rence. These metrics conflict. Hence: proportionality judgements cannot be neutral 
as between different theories of punishment.5 That’s the concern. But there are two 
1 Almost all of the contributors to this volume and an earlier edited collection raise significant chal-
lenges with proportionality judgements. See Michael Tonry (ed.), Of One-Eyed and Toothless Miscre-
ants: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
2 I take it that proportionality judgements will be approximate due to epistemic limitations. Some claim 
a stronger view, in which such judgements only specify a proportionate range. See Göran Duus-Otter-
ström, “Weighing Relative and Absolute Proportionality” in Tonry (n 1), pp. 32 and 47.
3 More fully, I assume that each crime is a justifiably criminalised culpable wrong.
4 This is suggested by Matt Matravers, “The Place of Proportionality in Penal Theory” in Tonry (n 1).
5 On the view sketched, proportionality judgements are outputs of a theory of punishment. But on some 
views, they may be inputs. Perhaps the most popular theory of punishment is side-constrained instrumen-
talism. Such a view may require that punishment (a) serves some instrumental good, but (b) may not be 
disproportionately severe. If (b) is not to collapse into (a), then this proportionality judgement must be 
independent of those instrumental goods. But even here the shape of the theory may drive the content of 
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ways to remain ecumenical. Either a proportionality judgement is favoured by all 
theories of punishment, or else it is more fundamental than those theories of punish-
ment. I will suggest that at least one of these explanations is true of my uncontrover-
sial case of proportionate punishment.
1  Lower Bound
Consider:
Theft: D intentionally steals £100 from C
Some punishments are obviously and uncontroversially disproportionate to the theft 
of £100. A death sentence is disproportionate.6 Unfortunately, this conclusion is not 
very useful as a guide to real-world cases.7 We are looking for a conclusion that is 
both obvious and potentially useful. Consider:
Restitution: It is not disproportionate to require D to return the £1008
This conclusion offers modest guidance for real cases. It sets a bound that is not 
wholly removed from the criminal fines available in many jurisdictions.
This judgement should appeal to all stripes of punishment theorist. Restitution-
ary theories should be on board, for obvious reasons. Consequentialists will follow 
suit: insofar as any punishments serve good ends, merely stripping criminal gains 
must count for the incentive effects alone. (Criminals may be poorer than their vic-
tims, and so benefit from increasing marginal utility. But incentivising negative-sum 
transactions cannot be the best solution). Retributivists will accept that D deserves 
at least that much suffering. True, D may have a benign motive, or else suffered too 
much in other areas of life, such that depriving him of that £100 compounds his 
aggregately undeserved suffering. But the criminal law cannot hope to give everyone 
what they deserve in full generality, and it would be an implausible retributivism 
which demanded it.9 Pluralists can tell the same story. Either D deserves that pun-
ishment, and it is not retributively disproportionate, or else D does not deserve that 
punishment, yet it is proportionate according to other dimensions of the justification 
6 We can imagine worlds in which littering, or the failure to punish littering, would result in extremely 
bad outcomes which might render such drastic measures proportionate. But I consider the real world.
7 In attempting to offer practically useful proportionality judgements, I follow eg Andrew von Hirsch 
and Nils Jareborg, “Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis”, 11 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies (1991): pp. 11–12.
8 Throughout I assume neither duress nor necessity. There is the deeper question of the justification of 
private property, especially under conditions of historical injustice. But I assume that the criminal law 
should leave aside such issues.
9 In this symposium Göran Duus-Otterström offers an ambitious reply: that desert is indexed to a par-
ticular contextual reference class. My answer is less ambitious. Regardless of whether desert itself is 
localised, the criminal law must treat it as if it were, as the alternative would be completely imprac-
ticable. For critics of this localisation, see Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations 
of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011) p. 68ff and Adam Kolber, “The Time-Frame 
Challenge to Retributivism” in Tonry (n 1).
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of punishment.10 If any theory of punishment disagrees, then I take that not as a 
mark against Restitution, but instead as a mark against such a theory. The strength 
of the intuition supporting Restitution is at least as strong as any intuition on which 
such a theory might rest.
Restitution requires that D return the stolen money. This conclusion is not frus-
trated if D happened to mix the stolen notes with his own notes, with no means of 
distinguishing the two. D must return the value of £100, not the very same notes. 
Nor is the conclusion frustrated if D happened to have spent (or lost) the money. He 
remains obliged to repay that value, even if this requires that he earn it first.11 If we 
accept Restitution, then we should accept:
Compensation: It is not disproportionate to require D to repay the value of 
£100
We might doubt whether Compensation amounts to punishment.12 Compensating is 
usually what happens before punishment kicks in. Compensation judgements justify 
the loss to D in part by balancing it with the gain to C. By contrast, punishment 
judgements focus only on the loss to D. True, many theories of punishment jus-
tify punishment in virtue of the benefits it provides to others. But most theories set 
certain side-constraints on the pursuit of those ends. Proportionality judgements are 
one such constraint. Third-party gains may be relevant to the all-things-considered 
permissibility or justification for punishment. But proportionality judgements are 
more restricted. They focus on the detriment to D and not the gain C. So, if we 
accept Compensation, then we should accept:
Disgorgement: It is not disproportionate to deprive D of the value of £100
Disgorgement is supported by the following cases. Imagine that C promptly dies 
alone and intestate, and thus cannot be compensated. This may extinguish D’s rela-
tional duty to compensate C. But it remains permissible to confiscate D’s stolen 
money. Or imagine that C would immediately burn the £100 once compensated. 
Again, the absence of gain for C does not make confiscation inapt. It is not dispro-
portionate to deprive D of the stolen money.
Disgorgement applies to Theft. But we can generalise the conclusion in three 
ways. First, £100 is arbitrary. It is not disproportionate to deprive D of whatever 
value D stole from C. Second, per above, it makes no difference whether D retained 
the gain from his crime. It is clearer, then, not to talk of ‘depriving’ D of value, 
but rather of imposing costs on D. Third, the costs which defendants cause victims 
10 This kind of move is readily available to those with a deflationary view of proportionality’s import, 
such as Douglas Husak, “The Metric of Punishment Severity” in Tonry (n 1) pp: 120–123.
11 Assuming that doing so is not dangerous, etc. Does this reasoning lead us to the debtor’s prison? Yes 
and no. No: I’ve said nothing about responding to non-criminally incurred debts. Yes: if D cannot (nor 
will not) repay his criminally-incurred debts, then this might justify further coercive measures to force 
him to do so, possibly including carceral sentences. But if this is a problem, then so is our practice of 
putting thieves in regular prison. The view according to which criminals incur obligations to their vic-
tims is in part inspired by Tadros’s Duty View: Tadros, The Ends of Harm (n 9) ch 12.
12 Thanks to Kim Ferzan for this point.
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are not confined to theft. The same conclusion applies to any harms intentionally 
inflicted. Thus generalised, if we accept Disgorgement, then we should accept the 
following metric of punishment proportionality:
Lower bound: Punishment is not disproportionate if it imposes costs on D no 
greater than the costs which D intentionally caused to others.
2  Clarifying Lower Bound
Lower bound is a limited thesis. It is not a claim about what amount of punishment 
is optimal or positively proportionate. It merely states a bound at which punishment 
is not disproportionately severe. It applies only to crimes involving intentionally 
inflicted costs. It says nothing about costs which do not eventuate, nor those not 
intended. This is deliberate. It is controversial how exactly to weigh culpability with 
harm.13 A full theory of proportionality must grapple with such cases. But I am not 
attempting to offer a full theory of proportionality. I focus only on the maximally 
uncontroversial case of legitimate punishments: punishments imposed in response to 
intentionally inflicted costs.14
Even thus limited, the generalisation from Disgorgement to Lower bound faces 
difficulties. The cost imposed by D in Theft was denominated in money. Disgorge-
ment used the same currency to identify a proportionate punishment. But most 
crimes and punishments lack this symmetry as to the kind of costs imposed. To be 
useful, Lower bound must offer a common currency of cost.15
Some doubt that there can be a common currency. Gardner claims that crimi-
nal harms are incomparable with harms imposed by punishment.16 But, if true, this 
13 Jesper Ryberg calls these the challenges of specifying harms (eg whether to include risks, or dif-
fuse costs), and weighing harm and culpability: Jesper Ryberg, “Proportionality and the Seriousness of 
Crimes” in Tonry (n 1).
14 A simple extension would be to risk-weight the costs of crime and multiply by variable culpability 
quotient. By default, say 1 for intended harms, and 0.7 for reckless crimes, subject to further modification 
for relevant culpability-affecting factors. In Theft, the equation is £100 harm*1 probability*1 culpability, 
for £100 of non-disproportionate punishment. In Attempted Theft, the equation might be £100*0.5*1, for 
£50 punishment. In Reckless Damage, it might be £100*1*0.7 for £70. Obviously this is crude, and sub-
ject to various potential objections. (Several are considered by Ryberg (ibid)). But the limited context of 
Lower bound seems to me insulated from many of these objections.
15 We could specify punishments in the same currency as the crime: an eye for an eye. Lower bound 
would bless these as proportionate. But it does not follow that such punishments are permissible, all 
things considered. Such punishments may be impermissible for reasons of mercy, humanity, etc. Even 
Kant, who thought it mandatory to kill killers, drew a line at torturing torturers. Jeremy Waldron once 
argued for more creative punishments to match crime to punishment. But he emphasised that lex talionis 
requires punishments similar to the crime, not identical. What counts as similar then depends on a dif-
ficult evaluation of the morally salient features of the crime. Jeremy Waldron, “Lex Talionis” 34 Arizona 
Law Review (1992) p. 25.
16 John Gardner, Offences and Defences (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007) p. 234. (Gardner says 
incommensurable, but I follow Ruth Chang’s terminology of comparability, for reasons explained by 
Nien-hê Hsieh, “Incommensurable Values” in Edward N Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy (Spring 2016) §1.2). Gardner further objected to weighing wrongs. Even lex talionis cannot make 
punishment’s harms perfectly mirror criminal harms in all ways. The deontic feature of being wrong 
must distinguish crimes from justified punishment, a point made by Waldron (ibid) pp. 33–34.
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implies that the (many) sentencing codes purporting to implement proportionate 
punishment are simply confused. Moreover, a strong version of this thesis would 
reject even the most obvious proportionality judgements, such as that death is dis-
proportionate to littering.17 That seems implausible.
How should we compare different kinds of costs? von Hirsch and Jareborg pro-
posed that criminal harms be compared according to the degree to which those 
harms impact the average person’s capacity to attain certain living standards. That, 
in turn, was to be judged in four ranks, across four interests: physical, material, dig-
nity, and privacy.18 As Bagaric and McConvill fairly point out, however, this speci-
fication and categorisation of relevant interests may be idiosyncratic.19 Bagaric and 
McConvill therefore proposed a more scientific common currency: happiness, as 
measured by empirical psychology.20
Both proposals face a dilemma. Imagine two facts. First: their proposed harm 
rankings rate harm A as worse than harm B. Second: on average, people would pre-
fer to suffer harm A rather than harm B. Here’s the dilemma. If the proposer insists 
that harm A is worse, then this seems mistaken. People do not prefer to suffer worse 
harms.21 But if the proposer accepts that harm B is worse, then their proposed rank-
ing is inferior to a (simpler) preference-based ranking.22 Preferences offer the most 
straightforward way to compare different kinds of cost. The lesser cost between a 
£100 fine and a day in prison is simply whatever D would prefer.
Still: whose preferences? Imagine that D intentionally breaks C’s nose. C may 
value her nose not being broken at £100. By contrast, D might value his nose at 
£1000. Which is the relevant metric? A related difficulty is often raised as an objec-
tion to retributive theories of proportionality. On retributive theories, deserved suf-
fering is the common currency of punishment severity.23 But ensuring that equal 
17 In extreme cases we have no difficulty comparing severity (death for littering), but in closer cases our 
intuitions overlap (prison for assault). This implies that the alleged incomparability is better explained 
by vagueness. This, indeed, is how some philosophers explain all apparently incomparable value judge-
ments. See Hsieh (ibid) §2.1.
18 von Hirsch and Jareborg (n 7).
19 For example, von Hirsch and Jareborg define their most serious rank as those harms which implicate 
‘subsistence’, and their least serious rank as those harm which implicate only our ‘enhanced well-being’. 
Does this imply that thieving a £1 loaf is worse than stealing £1000 loafers? Presumably not: their exam-
ples of subsistence-affecting harms are murder, maiming, and being made destitute. But even terrible 
maimings do not necessarily risk life, and thus may apparently fall outwith their top tier.
20 Mirko Bagaric and James McConvill, “Giving Content to the Principle of Proportionality: Happi-
ness and Pain as the Universal Currency for Matching Offence Seriousness and Penalty Severity” 69 The 
Journal of Criminal Law (2005) p. 50.
21 Bagaric and McConvill question whether it is even coherent to talk of preferring less happiness: ‘It 
normally leads to a suspicion that the agent is either confused, irrational or disingenuous’ (ibid) p. 63. 
But counterexamples abound. One might well prefer to suffer and struggle for meaning than to sit in 
contended idleness. Friedrich Nietzsche is the obvious philosophical enemy of happiness as intrinsically 
valuable. See, eg, Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality (London: Routledge, 2002) pp. 129–134.
22 Just as Bagaric and McConvill emphasise the large happiness literature in empirical psychology, we 
could emphasise the large preferences literature in empirical economics. Focusing on preferences also 
resolves von Hirsch and Jareborg’s difficulty with consensual harms: von Hirsch and Jareborg (n 7) pp. 
33–34.
23 But not (necessarily) crime seriousness.
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suffering is imposed for equal crimes leads to a dilemma. Equal sentences may pro-
duce differential suffering. A small prison cell makes Tall suffer more than Short. 
That is objectionable. On the other hand, equal suffering may require differential 
sentences. As Socialite suffers more from imprisonment than Hermit, it follows that 
Hermit requires a much longer sentence to be caused equal suffering. That too is 
objectionable. We reach an impasse.24 Some reject retributive theories of propor-
tionality for this reason.25 And these objections seemingly apply with equal force 
to my claim that we should weigh the costs of crime and punishments according to 
preferences, for preferences are no less variable than propensity to suffer.
The standard solution to this dilemma is to standardise. We focus on average suf-
fering, average living standards, average happiness, or average preferences.26 Ryberg 
points out that standardising is a distinctly second-rate solution for retributivists. 
They want to proportion punishment severity to the particular defendant’s desert, 
not the average defendant’s desert.27 But there is simply no alternative but to stand-
ardise.28 I suggested above that what D deserves to suffer will depend on the sever-
ity of his crime, and the severity of his crime will in part depend on the costs he 
caused to others. Regardless of the metric chosen, there is no way to compare costs 
to C against costs to D without standardisation. But this is not unique to counting 
costs, nor to a preference-based currency. The infinite variety of pre-legal wrongs 
are standardised by crime definitions: theft, robbery, murder, and so on. Every shade 
of culpability is standardised by mens rea categories: intent, recklessness, negli-
gence, and so on. It should come as no surprise, and offer no objection, that the 
same holds when it comes to identifying the costs of crime.29 We should consider 
average preferences. This does not entail that the idiosyncratic costs to particular 
victims are irrelevant. The best way to implement this standardisation may be to set 
the average costs of that type of crime as a starting point, but to allow further evi-
dence as to any deviations in a particular case. If D harms C knowing that C will be 
harmed more than the average victim, then D intends that additional harm to C, and 
Lower bound says that more-than-average punishment is not disproportionate.30 But, 
absent that information, we must settle for the average costs of that type of crime. 
24 Fines which scale to a defendant’s means offer a neat compromise and are lauded as such by Douglas 
Husak in this volume. But getting the upside of both positions comes with their downsides too. Rich 
defendants may pay exorbitant fines for minor transgressions, while poor defendants may pay trivial fines 
for major offenses.
25 Adam Kolber, “The Subjectivist Critique of Proportionality” in Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kes-
sler Ferzan (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Applied Ethics and Criminal Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2019).
26 Bagaric and McConvill (n 20) claim that determinants of happiness are, in fact, fairly invariant.
27 Ryberg (n 13).
28 A point emphasised in Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991).
29 Sentencing decisions are personalised, but only within broad buckets.
30 See Sect. 4, below.
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The same is true in principle for punishments, though there are powerful reasons to 
resist accounting for D’s characteristics.31
This suggests a (mostly) objective currency of cost. That should be unsurprising, 
for we have already seen such a metric in action. Restitution said that D must return 
the stolen £100. That applied regardless of whether D was rich or poor. It may be 
that D, being poor, suffers greatly from losing that £100. Perhaps much more than 
C suffered in losing it. Still, it seems clear that depriving D of that money is not dis-
proportionate. As such, at least some proportionality judgements sound in an objec-
tive metric. It does not follow that it is impermissible to make the rich pay more. But 
Restitution does set an objective floor of permissible punishment.
I have suggested that preferences offer the most parsimonious metric with which 
to measure the costs of crime and punishment. This also allows us to draw on the 
deep economic literature which attempts to measure those costs. This is not to say 
that measuring these costs is easy. It is not. Preferences may be inchoate and sub-
ject to revision. They may be means-ends irrational. Stated preferences may differ 
from revealed preferences. Different measurement strategies may come to different 
estimates as to the costs of crime. But the complexity of preferences and their iden-
tification reflects the complexities of the subject matter. We should not expect that 
comparing the very different and very subtle costs of crimes and punishments would 
be easy. I can offer no expertise in identifying these costs. But, in the next section, I 
will suggest which categories of costs we ought to consider.
3  The Costs of Crime
Lower bound says that punishment is not disproportionate if it imposes costs on D 
no greater than the costs which D intentionally caused to others. This requires that 
we know (1) what costs D caused, and (2) of those, which D intended. This section 
addresses (1).
My claim is that we undercount the costs of crime. Most writing on proportional-
ity focuses on the direct cost of crime. In Theft, that was £100. But this is far from 
the whole cost. Sometimes the marginal cost is noted. D caused C not just the loss 
of £100, but also anguish. And not just to C, but most likely her loved ones too.32 
D caused various criminal justice costs: the costs of police, prosecutors, lawyers, 
judges; their administrators, buildings, equipment, and travel. These are sometimes, 
if not always, recognised. But very rarely mentioned is the average cost of crime.33 
Many people take precautionary measures against being victimised, measures like 
taking taxis and buying security devices. These costs are not taken in response to 
33 Erin Kelly is an exception: see n 46, below.
31 In addition to the value of (perceived) equality before the law, there are moral hazard considerations, 
epistemic limitations as to D’s personal sensitivity, and so on.
32 Nozick argued that the anguish caused to third parties are the reason why ex-post ‘full’ compensation 
for crimes cannot work. (Though the argument only works assuming transaction costs). Robert Nozick, 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell 1974) 65–71.
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any one criminal, but instead in response to all crime of some type. D causally con-
tributes to the need to take such precautions, and hence to the total cost of crime. 
Finally, we should count not just out-of-pocket costs, but also opportunity costs, like 
the foregone value of walks at night. Together, these costs will far exceed the £100 
stolen. Focusing on direct costs strongly undercounts the costs of crime.
To get a feel for these costs, consider two cases:
City: In a city, D1 steals C’s bike. The police inform C that nothing can be 
done. The total cost of D1’s theft sums to £100.
Village: In a village, nobody locks up their bikes. D2 moves into the village 
and steals one bike. This causes all the villagers change their habits and buy 
locks. The total costs of D2’s theft sum to £10,000.
Both Ds commit the same crime. In Village, we can see the full costs imposed by 
D’s crime. A single thief can force a change of routine for an entire community. In 
City, however, those costs are masked. Regardless of D1’s conduct, the City folk 
would have raised their defences to other potential thieves.
Now, it would not be fair to hold D1 responsible for the actions of those other 
thieves. As von Hirsch and Jareborg put it,
Because a burglar is responsible only for his conduct, it is the harm that his 
conduct causes...that determines the gravity of the offence (not the totality of 
harm caused by the acts of all burglars, over whom he has no control).34
But it would be fair to hold D1 responsible for his share of the total cost caused. Imag-
ine that City has five bike thieves operating in the area, and, per Village, the threat they 
pose to bike security forces residents to take costly precautions summing to £10,000. If 
each steals a bike, they together cause £500 of marginal costs. Together, however, they 
cause an additional £9500 in precautionary costs. This outcome is overdetermined. 
But that is no bar to finding causal responsibility. Assuming equal causal responsibil-
ity, we may fairly attribute to them their share of the total cost: £2000.35 That is, we 
may attribute to them the average cost of that type of crime.36
My claim is that the focusing on the marginal cost strongly undercounts the 
average cost of crime. This is borne out by empirical work. A recent paper for 
the British Home Office estimated various costs of crime. The authors distinguish 
consequential costs from costs incurred in anticipation of and response to crime. 
34 von Hirsch and Jareborg (n 7) p. 16. See too p. 33.
35 The criminal law usually claims that any (more than minimal) causal contribution to a prohibited out-
come is sufficient to find that D caused that outcome. This apportionment argument, more familiar from 
civil law, is more conservative.
36 An objection: identical crimes ought not to receive wildly different punishments. D1 and D2 commit-
ted the same crime. To punish one 5 × more than the other is inappropriate. Reply: making the severity 
of one’s punishment determined in part by the contingent actions of others is hardly unknown to the law. 
Bad driving is punished very differently depending on whether or not a pedestrian walks out in front of 
the car. The law accounts for consequences. But, regardless of its position on moral luck, these crimes 
are not identically culpable. The first crime of its type is especially objectionable, as evidenced by its out-
sized role in theology, mythology, and popular morality: consider the Fall, original sin, Pandora’s box, or 
Cain and Abel. At any rate, we may want to rule out large within-crime variation in punishment for rea-
402 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2021) 15:393–405
1 3
Consequential costs are a reasonable proxy for marginal costs, while anticipation 
and response costs would be included within the average cost of crime.37 They esti-
mate that, on average, the consequential cost of vehicle theft is £4670. But the total 
cost, including anticipation and response measures, exceeds £10,000. For arson, the 
consequences sum to £3000, but the total cost exceeds £8000.38 The total unit (aver-
age) cost significantly exceeds the consequential (marginal) cost.
Cost of crime estimates face formidable epistemic challenges. The Home Office 
paper tried to estimate the costs of each crime type in a ‘bottom-up’ way: identify-
ing various costs incurred due to victimisation, prevention, and in response to crime. 
For example, they estimate the total expenditure on dedicated security products like 
burglar alarms, then divide that by the estimated number of burglaries. But this does 
not count, for example, the expenditure on products purchased in part for security 
against crime, like SUVs or taxi services. Nor does it account for the opportunity 
costs of crime: valuable foregone opportunities.
There are ways to estimate these costs. Researchers can ask people how much 
they are willing to pay to avoid victimisation. More creatively, they can use proxies 
like house prices to reveal implicit willingness to pay to avoid local crime. These 
‘top-down’ methods often produce estimates between 2 and 5 times greater than 
‘bottom-up’ methods.39 Consider an example. The Home Office paper estimated the 
unit cost of domestic burglary as just under £6000. Of this, they noted that house-
hold expenditure defending against burglary (eg burglar alarms) cost £320 per bur-
glary.40 I expect that the average household would happily pay at least this amount to 
guarantee not being burgled. If I’m right, the real cost of burglary is more like £320 
per household. And this implies that the true average cost per burglary is closer to 
£11,000.41 Using the average cost rather than the marginal cost massively increases 
the Lower bound of proportionate punishment.
Even the most sophisticated causal identification strategies cannot measure the 
full opportunity costs of crime. That requires not just constructing clever proxies, 
but also imagining alternative possible worlds. Some opportunity costs are easy 
to imagine because they were absent in the past. For example, the cost of airport 
38 Matthew Heeks et  al., “The economic and social costs of crime” (2nd edn, Home Office Research 
Report 99, July 2018) Table E1. In most crimes the consequential cost was a higher percentage of the 
total cost, but even homicide was only 70%.
39 Mark Cohen and Roger Bowles, “Estimating Costs of Crime” in Alex R. Piquero and David Weisburd 
(eds.), Handbook of Quantitative Criminology (New York: Springer, 2010) p. 158, citing Mark Cohen 
et al., “Willingness-to-pay for crime control programs” 42 Criminology (2004) p. 86.
40 Heeks et al. (n 38).
41 (24 million England and Wales households)*£320)/695,000 domestic burglaries. The latter figure is 
from Heeks et al. (n 38) Table E1.
37 Strictly speaking, these categories are not coextensive: anticipation and response costs may be specific 
to the marginal offence, not general offending. But those will be exceptional cases. The main cost of 
policing, for example, is not the marginal costs of fuel, documentation, etc., but the fixed costs of sala-
ries, buildings, etc.
Footnote 36 (continued)
sons besides proportionality (eg to maintain an appearance of equal treatment). To repeat, Lower bound 
is not a full theory of punishment.
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security checks. (Quick estimate: at least $22bn per year in the US alone).42 Other 
opportunity costs are easy to imagine because they’ve only recently been miti-
gated. Until recently, it was nigh unthinkable to transact at arms-length with, pay 
for chauffeuring from, or stay in the home of individual strangers. The unthinkable 
is now routine, thanks to PayPal, Uber, Airbnb, and other platforms. A major com-
ponent of the success of these companies lay in assuring people that they would not 
be scammed or murdered.43 There was never any insuperable barrier to mail-order 
transacting or paying strangers for a lift or a room. But would-be scammers and mur-
derers prevented that value from being realised, until these companies could resolve 
the assurance problem. Their multi-billion valuations and massive consumer surplus 
are an indicium of the previously-unrealised opportunity cost of such crimes.
A good statistician may be able to estimate the crime-avoiding component of 
the value such companies generate. But no statistician can measure the value of the 
companies which have not been created, or the rewards to be reaped from solving 
remaining assurance problems. The hardest opportunity costs to imagine are those 
we have always and still do suffer. They go unthought. But they are no less costs of 
crime, and quite possibly the largest component of that cost. Almost every crime 
contributes, in some way, to causing these opportunity costs.
Estimating a particular defendant’s contribution to causing these (already hard-to-
estimate) costs will be extremely difficult. We must work out the number of offend-
ers, and whether their crime was more or less costly than average. We will have to 
disaggregate the combined effect of different crime types, such as murder and rob-
bery, to work out their relative contribution to the cost of (say) fear and precautions 
against violence. And we will have to work out the temporal and spatial extent of 
these causal contributions. In practice, these will be very rough estimates, subject to 
more detailed evidence. Lower bound cannot offer precision.
A defendant may claim that these costs are too causally remote from their crime. 
But, with a little imagination, these costs are certainly foreseeable. That meets the 
usual lawyer’s test for causal proximity. Alternatively, D may claim that many of 
these costs are incurred via the free and deliberate actions of others, actions often 
said to break the causal chain between D and further consequences. But this rule 
does not apply to officials reasonably responding to crime, nor to reasonable 
reactions by victims.44 All of the costs I have mentioned plausibly fall into those 
42 The US Bureau of Transportation Statistics reported 1.1bn airline passengers (domestic and interna-
tional) travelling through the US in 2019 (BTS 14–20). Assuming an hour lost per passenger, valued at 
the median US wage of $20, gives $22bn. This does not account for the costs of hassle nor enforcement. 
It does not automatically follow that the terrorists who spurred these measures are causally responsible 
for them; there is a live question as to whether such measures were reasonable.
43 Histories of the early days of PayPal emphasise that its survival, and success, depended on stemming 
massive quantities of fraud.
44 Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279. Questions of legal causation ask whether D caused some prohibited 
outcome for the purposes of attributing that outcome to him. But that is not strictly our question. We are 
asking whether, once D has caused some prohibited outcome, then may we attribute to him some fur-
ther consequences? In answering the latter question, we might plausibly accept more inclusive criteria of 
causal attributability.
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categories. It seems fair to hold defendants causally responsible for their contribu-
tion to all of these costs of crime.
4  Culpable Costs
I have suggested, however roughly, how we might measure the costs of crime. Lower 
bound then asks us to consider which of those costs D intended.
No defendant sets out to cause all of the costs mentioned above. But we do not 
only intend our ultimate ends. In law, we are said to (indirectly) intend any known 
consequences of our intentional actions.45 In Theft, D does not intend to cause harm 
of merely £100. He also knows, and so intends, to cause C to suffer further con-
sequences. If D knew of his entire contribution to the average cost of that type of 
crime, then Lower bound says that punishments which match those costs are not 
disproportionate.46
In practice, it will be hard to prove exactly what D knows. But a legal system 
could quite easily advertise the average cost of various types of crime, and thereby 
make it the case that defendants must know, and so intend, to cause those costs when 
offending. (Indeed, a sentencing scale partly fulfils this function by signalling the 
severity of each crime).
Because Lower bound is intended to be maximally uncontroversial, I limited its 
scope to intention and knowledge. But it could be modified to weaken that assump-
tion and to stretch to recklessly caused costs. That modified version of Lower bound 
would make it easier yet to attribute to D the average cost of that type of crime.
5  What Follows?
If the costs of crime are usually undercounted, then Lower bound, which indexes 
to those costs, may bless as proportionate some punishments which are intuitively 
quite severe. The Home Office paper suggests that the average personal theft is of 
goods valued at £180. For this, we may intuitively think that anything much worse 
than a small fine would be too harsh. English sentencing law agrees. For petty theft 
below £500, without threatening the victim, offenders are fined 125% to 175% of 
their weekly income (and must disgorge any additional value of the stolen goods).47 
Assuming that the average petty thief earns about half the UK average (so, £250) 
46 Erin Kelly claims that an ‘upper bound’ for a ‘proper penalty’ is scaled to the ‘typical harm caused 
by the sort of crime’ D committed sets. If ‘scaled to’ means ‘set by’, then this seems wrong. If D delib-
erately commits a crime much worse than average, on what basis ought his liability to punishment to 
be capped to a level appropriate to the much more benign average? Erin Kelly, The Limits of Blame: 
Rethinking Punishment and Responsibility (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018) 
p. 141.
47 The Sentencing Council’s guidelines for theft grade this as ‘medium culpability’ and low value stolen.
45 English law phrases this in terms of foreseen virtual certainties: Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82.
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that is a range of roughly £310 to £440.48 But the Home Office report estimates the 
full average cost of theft as £1380. And, given that this is an underestimate, the total 
cost may easily be several times higher. Lower bound would therefore accept fines 
many times higher than at current levels.
Of course, as I have emphasised throughout, Lower bound does not attempt to 
offer a full theory of proportionality, still less a full theory of permissible punish-
ment. There may be many excellent reasons why fines of that level are a bad idea. 
Most obviously, many criminals simply cannot pay them.49 (Indeed, more serious 
offences quickly result in incarceration as a result). Even if defendants could pay 
such amounts, there may be good moral and prudential reasons not to further immis-
erate poor criminals. But Lower bound does help us to structure our thinking here. 
Such objections to more severe sentences should not sound as claims about dispro-
portionality. Rather, they should sound as claims about the instrumental costs and 
benefits of different punishment regimes.
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